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Introductive remarks
Nowadays, vulnerability can be considered one of the most challenging legal, philosophical and political concepts:
due to its indeterminacy -or despite it -it has acquired a privileged status in many of the most important contemporary debates, not last the ones concerning resilience, public insecurity, ontological or pathological vulnerability, labelling and stereotypes, responsiveness and responsibility (just to name a few).
Currently, the concept is especially present in feminist philosophical debate(s), where -in particular, in its ontological dimension -it is largely considered a fruitful foundation for a critic to the "liberal subject", as well as for the renewal of the entire category itself (cf. Butler, 2004; Cavarero, 2013; Ferrarese, in this volume; Fineman and Grear, 2013; Guaraldo, 2012; MacKenzie et al., 2014) .
It should not be surprising, then, the widespread reference to an "ethics of vulnerability" (Gilson, 2014) , which is intended to be able to promote a radical transformation at a societal level, as well as at the institutional one, favouring also the visibility of those subjects who rhetorically do not fit the liberal assumption of a rational, independent, unencumbered and self-sufficient subject.
Still, while the fruitful insights of this concept should not be put in doubt, it should also be acknowledge that its indeterminacy and malleability are susceptible of a stigmatising and discriminatory usage. This occurrence is extremely evident in the legal field, where it is easy to verify the interchangeable use of expressions like "vulnerable", "weak" and "fragile", referred to groups whose members are intended to need a special protection, due to their particular condition. In this sense, the current equivalence of the above mentioned terms is likely to have a "labelling-effect" on those who take part to some specific groups, reinforcing their distance from the paradigmatic subject of law and legitimising patronising attitudes toward them.
For this reasons, in paragraphs 2 and 3 I will firstly address the current legal use of the category at stake, and then consider 
Law's attitude to vulnerability
Although currently widespread, the presence of terms like "vulnerability"
and "vulnerable groups/individuals" in the legal field is recent: it is used to stress the particular protection granted to certain At first glance, this attention to individual peculiarities seems to translate in the legal realm the philosophical concept of "equal valorisation of difference" (Ferrajoli, 2007: 795-797) , whose aim is that of promoting a full legal recognition of all the subjects, in contrast to whatever form of assimilationist attitude, normally associated to the liberal subject.
Nevertheless, cautions in its use
should not be abandoned, while the current reference to the concept in question runs a real risk to evoke a notion of otherness that, by supporting the introduction of a double-track protection, is likely to produce exclusionary practical consequences, legitimizing -amongst others -patronising legal practices and violence, as well as of gender violence. In the same vein, but with a richer enumeration of the conditions that can lead to vulnerability, see dir. 2013/33/UE. An attention to "vulnerable groups" is present also in the jurisprudence of the European court of human rights which, starting from the first decade of the new millennium, make reference to "vulnerable groups". On the latter aspect, cf. Peroni and Timmer, 2013; Timmer, 2013 . An additional criticism of the concept, only partially related to those analysed up to now, lies in the fact that "vulnerability" is commonly associated with "weakness", the two words being very often used as synonyms, at least in the Italian legal context (cf. e.g. Azzena, 2006; Cendon, 2008; Stanzione, 2009 (Mazzoni, 2013: 235) .
"Weak", indeed, is not used in relation to the abstract subject of law we inherited from the liberal tradition, but only with reference to "other" and concrete subjects, perceived as opposed to the "pure" one, the one without other (explicit)
connotations, who embodies the "standard for point-of-viewlessness" (MacKinnon, 1983: 639 Bergoffen, 2012: 109; Otto, 2006: 318) .
As mentioned, the association between weakness and vulnerability in the legal sphere legitimizes frequently a double standard of protection, where the provision of ad hoc legal instruments, while giving visibility to non paradigmatic subjectivities, is actually based on the failure of some persons to fit the standard of normality, i.e. the invulnerable subject who does not experience any kind of weakness. Thus, the existing legal norms which are referred to weak and (exceptionally) vulnerable subjects not only justify, but also solicit a pervasive and patronizing intervention, based on the need of "protecting the vulnerable" (Goodin, 1985) 3 .
As it is clear, instead of favouring a true recognition of everyone's 3 Furthermore, in the political field some Authors aim at realising a more egalitarian society calling for a "responsive State", which should address the needs of all the vulnerable subjects (Fineman, in (Gianformaggio, 2005) , preferential measures should equally be rejected, because they do not challenge the symbolic imaginary they are modelled upon and, therefore, also their pressure to conform to a supposed standard (namely, this volume), eventually including the principle of responsibility to care among those principles which are considered fundamental to govern a liberal society (Fineman, 2004; Kittay, 1999) . In its broader philosophical dimension, as previously stated, the truism at stake normally acquires relevance in its attitude to be provocative for ethics: many feminist thinkers, indeed, locate this attitude in its capacity to elicit a response (Murphy, 2011: 577) . In my opinion, however, by emphasising the responsivity to a vulnerable condition, the current perspectives focus mainly on those charged of responding to the needs of vulnerable persons, instead of on the latter. In this way, they suggest the idea of vulnerable not affirm new rights, but extends the scope of the already existing ones, favouring -as some commentators already argued -the transition of the disabled individuals from a condition of legal "objectification" and passivity to one of "full subjectivity" (Quinn and Degener, 2002 : 1).
Periódico do Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre Gênero e Direito
Apparently, then, the UNCRPD constitutes solely a further step in the long process of specification of those subjects who have been recognised internationally as human rights holders; a process, as famously Bobbio observed some time ago, which has favoured the transition from an abstract subject (of law), modelled upon a generic human being, to multiple subjects of law and subjectivities (Bobbio, 1990: 68-69).
Nevertheless, the novelty of UNCRPD seems greater than the operation of widening the range of those subjects who are considered human rights holders.
individuals as passive subjects and, therefore, undermine their agency and autonomy, risking also perpetrating a patronising attitude toward those depicted as vulnerable. Similarly, both children's rights theorists and disability rights theorists have highlighted the danger in considering vulnerability as exclusion of agency and passiveness, denouncing its totally disempowering outcomes (Timmer, 2013: 153; Vandehole and Ryngaert, 2012) . Furthermore, the idea that UNCRPD is the legal expression of a paradigm different from the one based on total or partial lack of reasoning), the case of mental disabilities is partially different. Indeed, although the medical model of disability has to be firmly rejected in favour of a socio-contextual one, where disability is the result of the interaction between a person with impairment and the wider environment(s), nevertheless the presence of an impairment (even if socialised) cannot be overcome, since it is not the result of sole prejudices.
Periódico Rather, the Convention seems coherent with the universalistic notion of vulnerability, the one that considers 8 It is worth to notice that this framework is not incompatible with the particular notion of vulnerability (as explained above) that, when vulnerability as part of the ontological dimension of every human being. For this reason, UNCRPD seems one of the existing clearest legal attempts to overcome the liberal paradigm, being it modelled on a subject whose rationality is not decisive in ascribing legal subjectivity, and who acts in a network of relationship: a vulnerable subject.
Toward a new idea of legal capacity
The relevant shift carried out by UNCRPD is intended to have a highly transformative impact: indeed, the juridical recognition of the full legal capacity of individuals with disabilities is likely to lead to remarkable juridical consequences primarily for disabled persons, but also for all those categories of subjects who see their legal capacity restrained, because of their supposed lack of rationality. In this sense, the theoretical affirmation of a paradigm framed starting from a universal notion of vulnerability 8 is susceptible to produce very practical effects, because of its ability to favour the included in a paradigm based upon vulnerabilityinstead of in a rationalistic one -loses its current discriminatory features. Guardianship, as it is widely known, is a legal process which is utilised when a person is considered no (or no longer) able to make or communicate her decision about her person or property; currently intended as the better system available in 11 In the opinion of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the existing legal systems should remove also functional tests of mental capacity, as well as outcome-based approaches that lead to denials of legal capacity, if they are either discriminatory or disproportionately affect the right of persons with disabilities to equality before the law. In this regard, the reports adopted by Tunisia, Spain, Peru, Argentina, China and Hungary on the basis of art. 35 UNCRPD revealed that all these legal systems do not respect art. 12 UNCRPD. On the contrary, Czech Republic is the first State, which reformed the notion of legal capacity, in conformity to the one contained in the UNCRPD. (Bach and Kerzner, 2010: 73; Devi, 2013: 795-797) . In these cases, a possible solution could be to distinguish the concept of "substitute decision making" from the one of "substitute judgement" (Jaworska, 2009) , therefore admitting that, in presence of hard cases (and only in those ones), the person who acts as decision- 13 "Now what about those whose will is undetectable or for whom it is not possible to ascribe a will or preference? […] I think the hard reality which is that sometimes decisions will be made "for" and not "with" does not mean that It should be noted also that, while the support decision-making paradigm should indubitably be theoretically referred to the vulnerable subject, nevertheless it goes beyond the current debate concerning the latter. Normally, indeed, critics to a rational subject are with reality […] or admitting the obvious and then using our talents to lock in the exception and transform how decisions are "made for" people" (Quinn, 2010: 14) . 14 It should be stressed, however, that this concept is not a new: it is currently used in the in clinical practice by physicians and bioethicists, particularly for what concerns advance directives. 
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